Abstract. We specify an information flow analysis for a simple imperative language, using a Hoare-like logic. The logic facilitates static checking of a larger class of programs than can be checked by extant type-based approaches in which a program is deemed insecure when it contains an insecure subprogram. The logic is based on an abstract interpretation of program traces that makes independence between program variables explicit. Unlike other, more precise, approaches based on a Hoare-like logic, our approach does not require a theorem prover to generate invariants. We demonstrate the modularity of our approach by showing that a frame rule holds in our logic. Moreover, given an insecure but terminating program, we show how strongest postconditions can be employed to statically generate failure explanations.
Introduction
This paper specifies an information flow analysis using a Hoare-like logic and considers an application of the logic to explaining insecure flow of information in simple imperative programs.
Given a system with high, or secret (H), and low, or public (L) inputs and outputs, where L ≤ H is a security lattice, a classic security problem is how to enforce the following end-to-end confidentiality policy: protect secret data, i.e., prevent leaks of secrets at public output channels. An information flow analysis checks if a program satisfies the policy. Denning and Denning were the first to formulate an information flow analysis for confidentiality [13] . Subsequent advances have been comprehensively summarized in the recent survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [29] . An oft-used approach for specifying static analyses for information flow is security type systems [25, 31] . Security types are ordinary types of program variables and expressions annotated with security levels. Security typing rules prevent leaks of secret information to public channels. For example, the security typing rule for assignment prevents H data from being assigned to a L variable. A well-typed program "protects secrets", i.e., no information flows from H to L during program execution.
In the security literature, "protects secrets" is formalized as noninterference [15] and is described in terms of an "indistinguishability" relation on states.
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Two program states are indistinguishable for L if they agree on values of L variables. The noninterference property says that any two runs of a program starting from two initial states indistinguishable for L, yield two final states that are indistinguishable for L. The two initial states may differ on values of H variables but not on values of L variables; the two final states must agree on the current values of L variables. One reading of the noninterference property is as a form of (in)dependence [9] : L output is independent of H inputs. It is this notion of independence that is made explicit in the information flow analysis specified in this paper.
A shortcoming of usual type-based approaches for information flow [5, 16, 31, 26] is that a type system can be too imprecise. Consider the sequential program l := h; l := 0, where l has type L and h has type H. This program is rejected by a security type system on account of the first assignment. But the program obviously satisfies noninterference -final states of any two runs of the program will always have the same value, 0, for l and are thus indistinguishable for L.
How can we admit such programs? Our inspiration comes from abstract interpretation [10] , which can be viewed as a method for statically computing approximations of program invariants [11] . A benefit of this view is that the static abstraction of a program invariant can be used to annotate a program with preand postconditions and the annotated program can be checked against a Hoarelike logic. In information flow analysis, the invariant of interest is independence of variables, for which we use the notation [x # w] to denote that x is independent of w. The idea is that this holds provided any two runs (hereafter called traces and formalized in Section 2) which have the same initial 1 value for all variables except for w will at least agree on the current value of x. This is just a convenient restatement of noninterference but we tie it to the static notion of variable independence.
The set of program traces is potentially infinite, but our approach statically computes a finite abstraction, namely a set of independences, T # , that describes a set of traces, T . This is formalized in Section 3. We formulate (in Section 4) a Hoare-like logic for checking independences and show (Section 5) that a checked program satisfies noninterference. The assertion language of the logic is decidable since it is just the language of finite sets of independences with subset inclusion. Specifications in the logic have the form, {T # } C {T # 0 }. Given precondition T # , we show in Section 6 how to compute strongest postconditions; for programs with loops, this necessitates a fixpoint computation 2 . We show that the logic deems the program l := h; l := 0 secure: the strongest postcondition of the program contains the independence [l # h].
Our approach falls in between type-based analysis and full verification where verification conditions for loops depend on loop invariants generated by a theorem prover. Instead, we approximate invariants using a fixpoint computation. Our approach is modular and we show that our logic satisfies a frame rule (Sec-tion 7). The frame rule permits local reasoning about a program: the relevant independences for a program are only those [x # w] where x occurs in the program. Moreover, in a larger context, the frame rule allows the following inference (in analogy with [23] ): start with a specification {T # } C {T # 0 } describing independences before and after store modifications; then, We also show (Section 9) that strongest postconditions can be used to statically generate failure explanations for an insecure but terminating program. If there is a program fragment C whose precondition contains [l # h], but whose strongest postcondition does not contain [l # h], we know statically that C is an offending fragment. Thus we may expect to find two initial values of h which produce two different values of l. We consider two ways this may happen [13] ; we do not consider termination, timing leaks and other covert channels. One reason for failure of [l # h] to be in the strongest postcondition, is that C assigns H data to a L variable. The other reason is that C is a conditional or a while loop whose guard depends on a high variable and which updates a low variable in its body. Consider, for example, if h then l := 1 else l := 0. Our failure explanation for the conditional will be modulo an interpretation function, that, for distinct variables h 1 and h 2 map h 1 to true and h 2 to false. Under this interpretation, the execution of the program produces two different values of l. This explains why l is not independent of h. Because we use a static analysis, false positives may be generated: consider if h then l := 7 else l := 7, a program that is deemed insecure when it is clearly not. However, such false positives can be ruled out by an instrumented semantics that tracks constant values more precisely.
Contributions. To summarize, this paper makes three contributions. First and foremost, we formulate information flow analysis in a logical form via a Hoarelike logic. The approach deems more programs secure than extant type-based approaches. Secondly, we describe the relationship between information flow and program dependence, explored in [1, 18] , in a more direct manner by computing independences between program variables. The independences themselves are static descriptions of the noninterference property. In Section 8, we show how our logic conservatively extends the security type system of Smith and Volpano [31] , by showing that any well-typed program in their system satisfies the invariant [l # h]. Thirdly, when a program is deemed insecure, the annotated derivation facilitates explanations on why the program is insecure by statically generating counterexamples. The development in this paper considers termination-insensitive noninterference only: we assume that an attacker cannot observe nontermination. Complete proofs of all theorems appear in the companion technical report [3] ; selected proof subcases appear in the Appendix.
Language: syntax, traces, semantics
This section gives the syntax of a simple imperative language, formalizes the notion of traces and gives the semantics of the language in terms of sets of traces.
Syntax. We consider a simple imperative language with assignment, sequencing, conditionals and loops as formalized by the following BNF. Commands C ∈ Cmd are given by the syntax
where Var is an infinite set of variables, x, y, z, w ∈ Var range over variables and where E ∈ Exp ranges over expressions. Expressions are left unspecified but we shall assume the existence of a function fv(E) that computes the free variables of expression E. For commands, fv(C) is defined in the obvious way. We also define a function modified : Cmd → P(Var) that given a command, returns the set of variables potentially assigned to by the command.
Traces. A trace t ∈ Trc associates each variable with its initial value and its current value; here values v ∈ Val are yet unspecified but we assume that there exists a predicate true? on Val. (For instance, we could have Val as the set of integers and let true?(v) be defined as v = 0). We shall use T ∈ P(Trc) to range over sets of traces. Basic operations on traces include:
-ini-t(x) which returns the initial value of x as recorded by t; -cur-t(x) which returns the current value of x as recorded by t; -t[y → v] which returns a trace t ′ with the property: for all x ∈ Var, ini-t ′ (x) = ini-t(x) and if x = y then cur-t ′ (x) = cur-t(x); but cur-t ′ (y) = v. -The predicate initial T on sets of traces T holds iff for all traces t ∈ T , and for all variables x, we have ini-t(x) = cur-t(x).
For instance, we could represent a trace t as a mapping Var → Val × Val; with t(x) = (v i , v c ) we would then have ini-t(x) = v i and cur-t(x) = v c .
We shall write t 1 x = t 2 to denote that cur-t 1 (x) = cur-t 2 (x), and we shall write ¬(t 1 x = t 2 ) to denote that t 1 x = t 2 does not hold. Also, with X a set of variables we shall write t 1 = X t 2 to denote that for y / ∈ X, ini-t 1 (y) = ini-t 2 (y) holds. That is, the initial values of all variables, except for those in X, are equal in t 1 and t 2 . We shall write
Semantics. We assume that there exists a semantic function [[E]] : Trc → Val which satisfies the following property:
The definition of [[E]] would contain the clause [[x]](t) = cur-t(x). For each T and E we define
where C = while E do C0 and
The semantics of a command has functionality [[C]] : P(Trc) → P(Trc), and is defined in Fig. 1 . To see that the last clause in Fig. 1 is well-defined, notice that F C is a monotone function on the complete lattice P(Trc) → P(Trc).
Independences
We are interested in a finite abstraction of a (possibly infinite) set of concrete traces. The abstract values are termed independences: an independence T # ∈ Independ = P(Var × Var) is a set of pairs of the form [x # w], denoting that the current value of x is independent of the initial value of w. This is formalized by the following definition of when an independence correctly describes a set of traces. The intuition is that x is independent of w iff any two traces which have the same initial values except on w must agree on the current value of x; in other words, the initial value of w does not influence the current value of x at all.
This is motivated by the desire for a subtyping rule, stating that if
is a subset of T # 1 and therefore obtainable from T # 1 by removing information. Clearly, Independ forms a complete lattice wrt. the ordering; let ⊓ i T # i denote the greatest lower bound (which is the set union). We have some expected properties:
3 Facts 1 and 2 are used in the proof of the correctness theorem (Theorem 5, Section 5).
Moreover, we can write a concretization function γ : Independ → P(P(Trc)):
It is easy to verify that γ is completely multiplicative.Therefore [22] there exists a Galois connection between P(P(Trc)) and Independ, with γ the concretization function. Finally, we have the following fact about initial sets of traces.
Static Checking of Independences
To statically check independences we define, in Fig. 2 , a Hoare-like Logic where judgements are of the form G ⊢ {T
The judgement is interpreted as saying that if the independences in T # 1 hold before execution of C then, provided C terminates, the independences in T # 2 will hold after execution of C. The context G ∈ Context = P(Var) is a control dependence, denoting (a superset of) the variables that at least one test surrounding C depends on. For example, in if x then y := 0 else z := 1, the static checking of y := 0 takes place in the context that contains all variables that x is dependent on. This is crucial, especially since x may depend on a high variable.
We now explain a few of the rules in Checking a conditional, if E then C 1 else C 2 , involves checking C 1 and C 2 in a context G 0 that includes not only the "old" context G but also the variables that E depends on (as variables modified in C 1 or C 2 will be control dependent on such). Equivalently, if w is not in G 0 , then all free variables x in E must be independent of w, that is, [x # w] must appear in the precondition T # 0 . Checking a while loop is similar to checking a conditional. The only difference is that it requires guessing an "invariant" T # that is both the precondition and the postcondition of the loop and its body.
In Section 6, when we define strongest postcondition, we will select
} for the conditional and the while loop. Instead of guessing the invariant, we will show how to compute it using fixpoints. Example 1. We have the derivations and therefore also
With the intuition that l stands for "low" or "public" and h stands for "high" or "sensitive", the derivation asserts that if l is independent of h before execution, then provided the program halts, l is independent of h after execution. By Definition 1, any two traces of the program with different initial values for h, agree on the current value for l. Thus the program is secure, although it contains an insecure sub-program.
Example 2. The reader may check that the following informally annotated program gives rise to a derivation in our logic. Initially, G is empty, and all variables are pairwise independent; we write [x # y, z] to abbreviate [ 
A few remarks:
-in the preamble, only x is assigned, so the independences for l and h are carried through, but [x # l, x] holds afterwards, as [h # l, x] holds beforehand;
-the free variable in the guard is independent of l and x but not of h, implying that h has to be in G.
This means that any assignment in C is control dependent on w. Suppose now that y is independent of w in the postcondition T # . This implies that y cannot be assigned to in C -otherwise, it would be dependent on w. If y is not assigned to in C, then y must be independent of w in the precondition too. These intuitions are collected together in Lemma 1 below. Note that with y interpreted as "low" and w as "high", the lemma essentially says that low variables may not be written to under a high guard. Thus the lemma is the counterpart of the "no write down" rule that underlies information flow control; the term "*-property" [7] is also used. The value of low variables remains the same after execution of C.
Correctness
We are now in a position to prove the correctness of the Hoare logic with respect to the trace semantics.
Theorem 5. Assume that
, it is the case that x = y.
That is, if T is an initial set, then T # correctly describes the set of concrete traces obtained by executing command C on T .
The correctness theorem can be seen as the noninterference theorem for information flow. Indeed, with l and h interpreted as "low" and "high" respectively, suppose [l # h] appears in T # . Then any two traces in [[C]](T ) (the set of traces resulting from the execution of command C from initial set T ) that have initial values that differ only on h, must agree on the current value of l.
Note that the correctness result deals with "terminating" traces only. For example, with P = while h = 0 do h := 7 and
showing that P is deemed secure by our logic, yet an observer able to observe non-termination can detect whether h was initially 0 or not.
To prove Theorem 5, we claim the following, more general, lemma. Then the theorem follows by the lemma using 
Computing Independences
In Fig. 3 we define a function
with the intuition (formalized below) that given a control dependence G, a command C and a precondition
} holds, and T # 1 is the "largest" set (wrt. the subset ordering) that makes the judgement hold. Thus we compute the "strongest provable postcondition", which might differ 4 from the strongest semantic postcondition, that is, the largest set T
In the companion technical report [3] , we show how to also compute "weakest precondition"; we conjecture that the development in Sects. 7 and 9 could also be carried out using weakest precondition instead of strongest postcondition.
We now explain two of the cases in Fig. 3 . In an assignment, x := E, the postcondition carries over all independences [y # w] 
The case for while is best explained by means of an example. 
h # {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} {l, x, y} l # {h, x, y} {h, l} {h, l} {h, l} {h} {l} {l} ∅ {l} x # {h, l, y} {h, l, y} {h, l, x} {h, l, x} {h, l} {h, l} {l, x} {l} {l} y # {h, l, x} {h, l, x} {h, l, x} {l, x} {l, x} {l, x} {l, x} {l, x} {l, x} Our goal is to compute sp(∅, C, T # 0 ) and doing so involves the fixed point computation sketched below. 
For example, the entry T # 6 in the column marked "second" and in the second row from the bottom, denotes that sp({h, y}, x := y, T 
One case of the proof, dealing with while, is given in Appendix B. The following result is useful for the developments in Sections 7 and 9:
Lemma 4. Given y, C with y / ∈ modified(C). Then for all T # , G, w:
Modularity and the Frame Rule
Define lhs(T # ) = {y | [y # w] ∈ T # }. Then we have Theorem 8 (Frame rule (I)). Let T # 0 and C be given. Then for all T # , G:
Note that the weaker premise in 1 does not imply the stronger consequence in 2, since (with [z # w] playing the role of
In separation logic [19, 27] , the frame rule is motivated by the desire for local reasoning: if C 1 and C 2 modify disjoint regions of a heap, reasoning about C 1 can be performed independently of the reasoning about C 2 . In our setting, a consequence of the frame rule is that when analyzing a command C occurring in a larger context, the relevant independences are the ones whose left hand sides occur in C. Theorem 8 is proved by observing that part (1) follows from Lemmas 4 and 3; then part (2) follows using the following result: 
As a consequence of Theorem 8 we get the following result:
Proof. Using Theorems 8 and 7 we get sp(G, C, T 
The Smith-Volpano Security Type System
In the Smith-Volpano type system [31] , variables are labelled by security types; for example, x : (T, κ) means that x has type T and security level κ. The security typing rules are given in Fig. 4 in Appendix C. To handle implicit flows due to conditionals, the technical development requires commands to be typed (com κ) with the intention that all variables assigned to in such commands have level at least κ. The judgement Γ ⊢ C : (com κ) says that in the security type context Γ , that binds free variables in C to security types, command C has type (com κ).
We now show a conservative extension: if a command is well-typed in the Smith-Volpano system, then for any two traces, the current values of low variables are independent of the initial values of high variables. For simplicity, we consider a command with only two variables, h with level H and l with level L.
Theorem 9. Assume that C can be given a security type wrt. environment h :
The upshot of the theorem is that a well-typed program has [l # h] as invariant : if [l # h] appears in the precondition, then it also appears in the strongest postcondition.
The theorem is a straightforward consequence of the following lemma which facilitates a proof by induction. For L commands, the assumption h ∈ G in the lemma says that L commands cannot be control dependent on H guards. A proof of part 1, the case for while, appears in Appendix C.
Lemma 6.
Suppose
h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ⊢ C : (com H). Then for all G, T # , if [l # h] ∈ T # then [l # h] ∈ sp(G, C, T # ). 2. Suppose h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ⊢ C : (com L). Then for all G, T # , if [l # h] ∈ T # and h ∈ G then [l # h] ∈ sp(G, C, T # ).
Counter-example Generation
Assume that a program C cannot be deemed secure by our logic, that is,
Then we might expect that we can find a "witness": two different initial values of h that produce two different final values of l. However, below we shall see three examples of false positives: programs which, while deemed insecure by our logic, do not immediately satisfy that property. Ideally, we would like to strengthen our analysis so as to rule out such false positives; this does not seem immediately feasible and instead, in order to arrive at a suitable result, we shall modify our semantics so the false positives become genuine positives.
First, a program where writing a high expression to a low variable does not reveal anything about the high variable:
To deal with that, we assume that expressions are unevaluated (kept as symbolic trees); the formal requirement will be expressed as Property 2.
Next, a program where writing to a low variable under high guard does not immediately enable an observer to determine the value of the high variable.
if h then l := 7 else l := 7
To deal with that, we tag each assignment statement so that an observer can detect which branch is taken. Finally, a program where there cannot be two different final values of l:
There seems to be no simple way to fix this, except to rule out loops, thus in effect considering only programs with a fixed bound on run-time (since for such, a loop can be unfolded repeatedly and eventually replaced by a sequence of conditionals; this is how we handle loops with low guard). Remember (cf. the discussion in Section 5) that a program deemed secure by our logic may not be really secure if non-termination can be observed; similarly a program deemed insecure may not be really insecure if non-termination cannot be observed. Even with the above modifications, the existence of a witness is not amenable to a compositional proof. For example, consider the program
where E 1 and E 2 are some expressions. Inductively, on the assignment to l, we can find two different values for x, v 1 and v 2 , such that the resulting values of l are different. But we then need an extremely strong property concerning the assignment to x: that there exists two different values of h such that evaluating E 1 (h) wrt. these values produces v 1 , respectively v 2 . Instead, we shall settle for a result which says that all pairs of different initial values for h are witnesses, in that the resulting values of l are different. Of course, we need to introduce some extra assumptions to establish this stronger property. For example, consider the following program, where two different values of h, say 3 and 4, may cause the same branch to be taken:
To deal with that, our result must say that for every two values of h there exists an interpretation of true? such that wrt. that interpretation, different values of l result. In the above, we might stipulate that true?(3 = 0) but not true?(4 = 0). It turns out to be convenient to let that interpretation depend on the guard in question; hence we shall also tag guards so as to distinguish between different occurrences of the same guard. We shall now formalize the changes suggested above. First, we assume the existence of tags τ ∈ Tag, and functions tg : Tag × Val → Val, get-tg : Val → Tag, un-tg : Val → Val such that get-tg(tg τ (v)) = τ and un-tg(tg τ (v)) = v.
Commands C are now given by the syntax
where we have introduced assignment tags and guard tags. We write tg-t(x) for get-tg(cur-t(x)), write τ ∈ C if τ occurs syntactically in C, and write t ∆ C if for all x ∈ Var, tg-t(x) / ∈ C. In the following, we shall assume that tags are unique, that is, no tag τ occurs twice in a program C. As mentioned above, for the purposes of this section we shall rely on the following Property 2. If there exists z ∈ fv(E) with ¬(t 1
Concerning how to modify the semantics of commands, first observe that with the definition in Fig. 1 , it holds for programs without loops that [[C]] applied to a singleton set {t} returns a singleton set (this follows from a simple structural induction, simultaneously proving that [[C]](∅) = ∅). This motivates that we should now define the semantics as a function from Trc to Trc (rather than between the powersets), but as mentioned above we shall also need interpretation functions where an interpretation function I ∈ Intp is a partially defined predicate on values. We say that I covers C if I(v) is defined exactly when there exists a guard tag τ ∈ C such that v = tg τ (v 0 ) for some v 0 .
The semantics of a command thus has functionality Intp → Trc → Trc and is defined as follows:
We can now state our result concerning counter-examples; as discussed above it seems to be the best we can hope for. 
Then there exists
This theorem is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 7, stated below.
Definition 3. We say that C reveals y using z if for all t 1 , t 2 with t 1 ∆ C and t 2 ∆ C and ¬(t 1
, and such that C reveals y using z.
Example 4.
We consider an adaptation of the password checking example from [8] , with the while loop unfolded twice.
if τ 1 : p = g 1 then τ 2 : f := 1 else if τ 3 : p = g 2 then τ 4 : f := 1 else τ 5 : f := 2 By Theorem 10 there exists an interpretation function, I, such that for two distinct values of p, namely, p 1 and p 2 , f assumes different values. The I provided by the proof of the theorem will satisfy I(tg τ1 (p 1 = g 1 )) = true but I(tg τ1 (p 2 = g 1 )) = f alse. Then p 1 will result in a value of f which is tagged with τ 2 , and p 2 will result in another value of f which is tagged with either τ 4 or τ 5 (depending on the value of I(tg τ3 (p 2 = g 2 )) ). Hence the particular branch taken for the computation is revealed.
Discussion
Perspective. This paper specifies an information flow analysis for confidentiality using a Hoare-like logic and considers an application of the logic to explaining insecurity in simple imperative programs. Program traces, potentially infinitely many, are abstracted by finite sets of variable independences. These variable independences can be statically computed using strongest postconditions, and can be statically checked against the logic.
Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [14] We might try to model this approach in our framework by parameterizing Definition 1 wrt. parity, but it is not clear how to alter the proof rules accordingly. Instead, we envision our logic to be put on top of abstract interpretations. In the parity example, the above program would be abstracted to while h do h := h − 1 which our logic already deems secure.
Related work. Perhaps the most closely related work is the one of Clark, Hankin, and Hunt [8] , who consider a language similar to ours and then extend it to Idealized Algol, requiring distinguishing between identifiers and locations. The analysis for Idealized Algol is split in two stages: the first stage does a controlflow analysis, specified using a flow logic [22] . The second stage specifies what is an acceptable information flow analysis with respect to the control-flow analysis. The precision of the control-flow analysis influences the precision of the information flow analysis. Flow logics usually do not come with a frame rule so it is unclear what modularity properties their analysis satisfies. For each statement S in the program, they compute the set of dependences introduced by S; a pair (x, y) is in that set if different values for y prior to execution of S may result in different values for x after execution of S. For a complete program, they thus, as expected, compute essentially the same information as we do, but the information computed locally is different from ours: we estimate if different initial values of y, i.e., values of y prior to execution of the whole program, may result in different values for x after execution of S. Unlike our approach, their analysis is termination-sensitive.
To make our logic termination-sentitive 5 , we could (analogous in spirit to [8] To prove semantic correctness for the revised logic we would need to also revise our semantics, since currently it does not facilitate reasoning about infinite computations.
Joshi and Leino [20] provide an elegant semantic characterization of noninterference that allows handling both termination-sensitive and terminationinsensitive noninterference. Their notion of security for a command C is equationally characterized by C ; HH = HH ; C ; HH, where HH means that an arbitrary value is assigned to a high variable. They show how to express their notion of security in Dijkstra's weakest precondition calculus. Although they do not consider synthesizing loop invariants, this can certainly be done via a fixpoint computation with weakest preconditions. However, their work is not concerned with computing dependences, nor do they consider generating counterexamples.
Darvas, Hähnle and Sands [12] use dynamic logic to express secure information flow in JavaCard. They discuss several ways that noninterference can be expressed in a program logic, one of which is as follows: consider a program with variables l and h. Consider another copy of the program with l, h relabeled to fresh variables l ′ , h ′ respectively. Then, noninterference holds in the following situation: running the original program and the copy sequentially such that the initial state satisfies l = l ′ should yield a final state satisfying l = l ′ . Like us, they are interested in showing insecurity by exhibiting distinct initial values for high variables that give distinct current values of low variables; unlike us, they look at actual runtime values. To achieve this accuracy, they need the power of a general purpose theorem prover, which is also helpful in that they can express declassification, as well as treat exceptions (which most approaches based on static analysis cannot easily be extended to deal with).
Barthe, D'Argenio and Rezk [6] use the same idea of self-composition (i.e., composing a program with a copy of itself) as Darvas et alii and investigate "abstract" noninterference [14] for several languages. By parameterizing noninterference with a property, they are able to handle more general information flow policies, including a form of declassification known as delimited information release [28] . They show how self-composition can be formulated in logics describing these languages, namely, Hoare logic, separation logic, linear temporal logic, etc. They also discuss how to use their results for model checking programs with finite state spaces to check satisfaction of their generalized definition of noninterference.
The first work that used a Hoare-style semantics to reason about information flow was by Andrews and Reitman [4] . Their assertions keep track of the security level of variables, and are able to deal even with parallel programs. However, no formal correctness result is stated.
Conclusion. Beyond the work reported here, much remains to be done. This paper was inspired in part by presentations by Roberto Giacobazzi and Reiner Hähnle at the Dagstuhl Seminar on Language-based Security in October 2003. The reported work is only the first step in our goal to formulate more general definitions of noninterference in terms of program (in)dependence, such that the definitions support modular reasoning. One direction to consider is to repeat the work in this paper for a richer language, with methods, pointers, objects and dynamic memory allocation; an obvious goal here is interprocedural reasoning about variable independences perhaps using a higher-order version of the frame rule [24] . Hähnle's Dagstuhl presentation inspired us to look at explaining insecurity by showing counterexamples. We plan to experiment with model checkers supporting linear arithmetic, for example BLAST [17] , to (i) establish independences that our logic cannot find (cf. the false positives from Sect. 9); (ii) provide "genuine" counterexamples that are counterexamples wrt. the original semantics.
A Correctness
Our main goal is to prove Lemma 2, but first a bit of preparation. 
We infer that Proof. We perform induction in the derivation of G ⊢ {T # 1 } C {T # }, and do a case analysis on the last rule applied. We only list the case for while.
[While], with C = while E do C 0 . Assume that G ⊢ {T # } C {T # } because 
Combining (1) and (2), we get T 
